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We consider the problems of societal norms for cooperation and reputation
when it is possible to obtain cheap pseudonyms, something that is becoming
quite common in a wide variety of interactions on the Internet. This intro-
duces opportunities to misbehave without paying reputational consequences.
A large degree of cooperation can still emerge, through a convention in which
newcomers “pay their dues” by accepting poor treatment from players who
have established positive reputations. One might hope for an open society
where newcomers are treated well, but there is an inherent social cost in
making the spread of reputations optional. We prove that no equilibrium can
sustain significantly more cooperation than the dues-paying equilibrium in
a repeated random matching game with a large number of players in which
players have finite lives and the ability to change their identities, and there is
a small but nonvanishing probability of mistakes. Although one could remove
the inefficiency of mistreating newcomers by disallowing anonymity, this is
not practical or desirable in a wide variety of transactions. We discuss the
use of entry fees, which permits newcomers to be trusted but excludes some
players with low payoffs, thus introducing a different inefficiency. We also
discuss the use of free but unreplaceable pseudonyms, and describe a mech-
anism that implements them using standard encryption techniques, which
could be practically implemented in electronic transactions.
1. Introduction
One of the fundamental questions of social theory is the conditions
that facilitate cooperation. Repetition and reputation are two of the
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most useful features. Repetition causes people to cooperate in the
present in order to avoid negative consequences in future interactions
with the same people. Reputations spread information about peo-
ple’s behavior, so that expectations of future interactions can influence
behavior even if the future interactions may be with different people
than those in the present. The ways in which reputations spread can
affect their ability to influence behavior, and it is especially interest-
ing to consider situations where people exercise some control over
the spread of their own reputations, a situation that is common on
the Internet.
The Internet has spawned numerous social and business envi-
ronments that allow frequent and meaningful interactions among
strangers. This leads to many problems and properties that do not
usually arise in other social settings. However, the pliability of the
Internet as a social structure also allows for a large degree of “engi-
neering,” which is also more difficult in standard social settings,
allowing for the solution of many of these problems, and providing a
fertile ground for the application of many tools from economics and
game theory.1
The key aspect of reputation on the Internet that does not typi-
cally arise in nonelectronic settings is the ability to easily change one’s
identity; whereas in real life this is a complex process (often involving
national governments and cosmetic surgery), on the Internet an iden-
tity change may require just a few keystrokes.2 Thus, a person has a
choice of interacting anonymously (by changing identifiers constantly)
or maintaining a persistent identity. This case is intermediate between
persistent identities and totally anonymous interactions. In effect, the
option of anonymity turns the transfer of reputation information into
a strategic variable, controlled by each player, in contrast to previous
work (Kandori, 1992; Milgrom et al., 1990) where reputation transfer
is limited but not under players’ control.3
1 For example, recent applications include the economics of information (Varian,
1997), economic aspects of evaluations (Avery et al., 1999), aspects of competition (Bakos
and Brynjolfsson, 1998), cost sharing (Moulin and Shenker, 1992; Herzog et al., 1997)
and various properties of learning (Friedman and Shenker, 1998).
2 Many games, auction sites, and interactive forums allow users to choose a
pseudonym when they register. Even services that identify users based on their email
addresses do not prevent identity changes, since users can easily acquire new email
addresses through free services like Hotmail. Beyond name changes, the Internet
enables completely anonymous interactions. For example, anonymizing intermediaries
such as remailers and proxy servers can exchange messages between parties without
revealing either one’s identity to the other (Goldschlag et al., 1999; Reiter and Rubin,
1999). There are even techniques using cryptography that allow for electronic payments
where the buyer’s identity is untraceable (Schneier, 1996, pp. 139–147).
3 Tadelis (1999) considers an interesting model where reputation transfer is a strate-
gic variable but where performance is not. In that model, names may be traded from
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With name changes, people easily shed negative reputations.4
For example, some health support forums have been shaken by people
who pretend to have severe illnesses and other problems. Once found
out, such people often reappear on the same or a different forum with
a new identity and repeat the process. For example, Grady (1998)
reported on a woman who claimed that she had an eating disorder
and an abusive boyfriend to gain sympathy in an eating-disorder chat
group on the Internet. Eventually found out, she continued her tales
in other support groups.
Chased out of the eating-disorder chat room, the woman
turned up in others, including one for sexual-abuse sur-
vivors. She was found out and banished from that one,
too, then joined another group. When last heard from, she
was dying of AIDS.
Easy name changes make it natural to distrust newcomers, since
they may really be people who have just changed identifiers. But such
distrust imposes other costs. Grady (1998) reports:
In another scam that dragged on for months last year, a
girl [Kim] who said she was 15 communicated on line with
parents of premature infants. The 400 or so members in the
virtual support group had babies who were or had been
critically ill and had spent months in the hospital.   
Regardless of what drove Kim, her behavior had a chill-
ing effect on a group that had been trusting and closely
knit. Some parents expressed feelings of betrayal, and many
stopped posting messages. People in the group agreed to
provide information so a coordinator could verify that they
really were parents of preemies. Some newcomers were put
off by the atmosphere of suspicion.
Even with easy name changes, there can still be a fair amount of
cooperation, however, as people will want to develop positive reputa-
tions. For example, the on-line auction service eBay (www.ebay.com)
maintains a “Feedback Forum” for buyers and sellers to make com-
ments about each other, after a trade is completed.5 As analyzed by
higher-skill to lower-skill players, decreasing but not eliminating the signaling value of
reputations. By contrast, we are interested in situations where reputations serve not as
signals of underlying skill but as motivators for good performance.
4 On the Internet, nobody knows that yesterday you were a dog, and therefore
should be in the doghouse today.
5 Recognizing the importance of persistent reputations, eBay offers an easy name-
changing facility, but a person’s feedback comments follow such name changes. This
attempt to limit reputation shedding may be futile, however, since a person can easily
acquire a new email address and then reregister with no trace of the earlier comments.
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Kollock (1998), people go out of their way to accumulate positive com-
ments and, once they have accumulated them, to avoid negative com-
ments.6 Two empirical studies, by Lucking-Reiley et al. (2000) and by
Bajari and Hortacsu (2000), suggest that, at least for some product cat-
egories, negative comments reduce selling prices, though the studies
do not show a clear effect of positive comments on prices.
Newcomers can overcome initial distrust by accepting bad treat-
ment for a while, a form of dues paying that is sufficient to discourage
participants from changing identifiers. But suspicion of newcomers is
socially inefficient, especially in free-flowing environments with lots
of newcomers: it would be more efficient to trust newcomers until
they proved untrustworthy, if that did not provide incentives for par-
ticipants to misbehave and then change identifiers. The distrust can
be eliminated entirely through a subtle punishment strategy, where
newcomers are distrusted only if a veteran player in the previous
period did something wrong. That strategy is quite brittle, however, in
the face of either a few malicious participants7 or occasional mistakes
(trembles), such as typing the wrong key by accident. In fact, with
either malicious players or occasional trembles, we prove that there
is no way to achieve substantially more cooperation in equilibrium
than that achieved by distrusting all newcomers. Thus, the distrust of
newcomers is an inherent social cost of easy identity changes.8
6 One participant reported that after an accidental snafu, he received a check from
the seller for more than the purchase price of the item he had bought, along with a
request not to enter a negative comment. [David Richardson, personal communication,
January 1998.]
7 If it were possible to collapse an entire social order with a single malicious act,
then it is hard to imagine that some player would not topple the system for fun. Con-
sider such common entities on the Internet as viruses and worms.
8 This is somewhat analogous to the trust building that must accompany the begin-
ning of long-term relationships. Ghosh and Ray (1996), Kranton (1996), and Watson
(1999) analyze models where individuals form cooperative pairwise relationships that
either party can break off at any time. At the end of a relationship, both individuals
are randomly matched with someone else, and no information about past behavior is
available to the new partner. In order to maintain cooperation in the long-term rela-
tionships, there must be a cost to starting over, and the equilibria they find all begin
with some type of sunk cost, such as a slow start where partners play for low stakes
initially and gradually trust more over time. Breaking off a match in these models is
analogous to changing a pseudonym in our context, which in equilibrium must incur
a cost for the individual, to encourage players to maintain good behavior using their
current pseudonyms. In our model, when two newcomers meet, their play is analogous
to these slow-start strategies. However, unlike these models of long-term relationships,
starting over is not a symmetric act in our analysis; a veteran player can maintain a pos-
itive reputation with her current pseudonym even if an interaction partner acts badly
and starts over with a new pseudonym. This enables us to consider what happens
when newcomers interact with veterans, and we find equilibria where veterans extract
dues directly from newcomers rather than equilibria where newcomers dissipate value
in their interactions with each other. This behavior is analogous to an asymmetric ver-
sion of the giving of gifts that are costly to the giver but not valuable to the receiver,
The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms 177
Unfortunately, the obvious solution of disallowing anonymity
is problematic for a variety of reasons, from questions of civil liber-
ties to the practical effects on information exchange. On-line support
forums for diseases such as AIDS could not function without some
guarantees of anonymity, in order to avoid negative consequences
from people they know in real life finding out about their condition.
On a lighter side, many users of gaming network sites such as chess
(chess.onenet.net), backgammon (www.netgammon.com), bridge
(www.okbridge.com), go (igs.nuri.net), or quake (www.idsoftware.
com) prefer anonymity, while role-playing games depend fundamen-
tally on the disassociation between real identities and roles played.
Despite the disassociation with real identities, information about the
past behavior of players is important in choosing partners who play
at a similar skill level, have a compatible sense of sportsmanship, and
have fast network connections. Thus, we must encourage players to
maintain a persistent identifier within each social arena without rely-
ing on the verification and revelation of true identities.
An obvious candidate is the use of entry fees (associated with
each personal identifier). One commonly used procedure is a time-
consuming registration process; while such a procedure may encour-
age cooperation, it is clearly wasteful. Using monetary registration
fees entails no such loss of efficiency, as they are pure transfers, but
in a heterogeneous environment they may prevent players from using
the system, which is clearly inefficient, as these systems are essentially
public goods with zero or effectively negative marginal cost (due to
network externalities).
The conventional wisdom is that there is an inherent trade-off
between anonymity and accountability. For example, several articles
in a special issue of The Information Society emphasize that there are
real benefits to anonymity, despite the costs that come from reduced
accountability (Kling et al., 1999; Marx, 1999; Nissenbaum 1999). The
benefits stem from separating behavior in one realm from possible
repercussions in another, and can accrue to whistle blowers, politial
dissidents, people with stigmatized diseases, and people who merely
want to keep their purchasing behavior private from potential gos-
sips. The consensus of an AAAS-sponsored conference, as reported
by Teich et al. (1999), was that the trade-offs should sometimes be
resolved in favor of anonymity and thus that regulatory regimes
should strive to preserve the possibility of anonymity. We show, how-
ever, that it is not always necessary to choose: there is an intermediate
form of anonymity that maintains the privacy benefits but reduces the
social costs from loss of accountability.
which can also be used to maintain long-term relationships (see, e.g., Carmichael and
Macleod, 1996).
178 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
We propose a system of anonymous certificates in which, for each
different social arena, a person is given a single identifier that is unre-
lated to the person’s true identity; however, the certificate provider
guarantees that each person will only be granted a single certificate
(in each arena). We call these once-in-a-lifetime identifiers. A player
using a once-in-a-lifetime identifier effectively commits to having his
reputation spread through the arena. Given the option, players would
choose to make such commitments and thus achieve the same level of
cooperation that would be achieved playing under their true identi-
fiers. If, for example, a collection of support groups defined itself as a
single arena, then a malicious intruder could disrupt only one group;
exclusion from that group could lead to exclusion from the others. We
show that such certificates can be constructed with a large degree of
security using standard encryption techniques.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present
the basic model. Section 3 considers the effects of a fraction ε of mali-
cious players who thrive on sowing discord among the other players
and the related scenario where each player trembles with probability
ε. Section 4 discusses monetary entry fees. Finally, Section 5 presents
the certificate mechanism for once-in-a-lifetime identifiers.
2. The Basic Model
We consider an infinite, synchronously repeated game with periods
t ∈ T = {0 1    }. In each period, there are M active players. At the
end of each period, αM exit (e.g., their interests change and they no
longer visit the web site or participate in that newsgroup) and the
same number of new players enter. [Assume that α ∈ (0 1) and αM
is an integer.] Players are labeled by i ∈ Z+, where players 1    M
enter at t = 0. In each period, current players are matched at random
(uniformly) to play a prisoner’s dilemma9 with payoffs
C D
C 1 1 −1 2
D 2−1 0 0
At the beginning of each period, active players may have the
choice of continuing to play under their current identifiers or getting
new ones. (When obtaining a new identifier is possible, it is cost-
less; we discuss entry fees in Sec. 4.) When players are paired, each
9 While some of the real-world interactions we discuss, such as health support
forums, are not pure prisoner’s dilemmas, they do contain opportunities for either
selfish behavior that hurts others or for more cooperative, mutually benefical behavior.
The prisoner’s dilemma is a useful model because it places the incentives for choosing
between these behaviors in stark relief.
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is told only the identifier currently being used by the other. Thus, a
player who acquires a new identifier is indistinguishable (to all the
other players) from a new entrant to the system.
We assume that the system keeps a public history of which iden-
tifiers were paired in previous periods and the actions taken by the
players controlling those identifiers.10 Thus, when two players meet,
each can see the opponent’s complete history, which includes not only
the actions played by the opponent, but also those by the opponent’s
opponents, ad infinitum. To model this simply, we assume that in
period t the entire history of play, hts ∈ Hts , is common knowledge,
where hts is the pairing of identifiers and the actions taken in time
periods prior to t.11 Each player also knows her own personal history
of name changes, hti ∈ Hti , where hti is the history of identifiers used
by player i in periods prior to t.
We will also assume that there is an exogenous signal q, which is
uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. This signal is revealed at the beginning
of period t before players choose their actions.12 Player i’s strategy in
period t is a mapping sti : H
t
s ×Hti ×HtE → ({CD}), where HtE is the
history of exogenous signals up to and including qt. Let S be the set
of all such (mixed behavioral) strategies.
A player’s payoff for a strategy si is given by the total (undis-
counted) expected payoff. For example, if player i enters in period
b(i), then her payoff from strategy vector s, which includes her own







i is her payoff in period t and l(i) is the
“age” of player i when she exits the system.13 Note that the expected
10 In our scenario, it is not possible to have explicit norms of behavior that are
centrally enforced. It may be fairly easy, however, to publish the history and leave
the enforcement up to the actual players. In practice, this history is captured either by
monitoring play, as on the Internet Go Server (igs.nuri.net), or by gathering explicit
feedback from participants about each other, as on the Internet auction site eBay
(www.ebay.com). Wherever possible, explicit and centrally enforceable rules of behav-
ior should be applied, and then one can interpret our analysis as modeling the part of
the interaction for which such rules are not centrally enforceable.
11 This assumption is made to simplify notation; the equilibrium strategies that we
are interested in will use far less information. Also, this assumption allows us to disen-
tangle the effects caused by name changes from those generated by imperfect transfer of
information about the history of play. The question of the reliability of player-reported
information is quite complex and beyond the scope of this paper. For example, eBay
founder Pierre Omidyar exhorted users to give negative feedback when it was war-
ranted (Omidyar, 1998), apparently because users hesitated to give negative feedback
in fear that it would be reciprocated.
12 Once we introduce trembles (Section 3), there will be no need for exogenous
signals, as players would be able to correlate on the history of trembles. Nonetheless,
we will maintain the exogenous signals to simplify the presentation.
13 In our model, players do not know in advance when they will exit. Endogenous
exit creates problems of defection prior to exit. Tadelis (2000) analyzes a model in
which the possibility of privately selling one’s name upon exit maintains incentives for
cooperation prior to exit.
180 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
lifetime of a player is 1/α, so we define the normalized (per-period)
payoff to be αE[ui(s)].14 We will consider only sequential equilibria,
for which we use the standard definition (e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole,
1991).
Our benchmark for the amount of cooperation will be the aver-
age among all the players of the expected per-period payoff,






Thus, if every player cooperates in every period, then V = 1, while if
every player defects in every period, then V = 0.
2.1 Fixed Identifiers
If players are unable to change their identifiers (e.g., if they must
reveal their real-world names), the public history makes total coop-
eration a sustainable equilibrium. For example, suppose every player
adopts the following localized punishment strategy (LPS). LPS calls
for a player to play C against a newcomer or against a veteran who
complied with LPS in the previous period, and D against a veteran
who deviated in the previous period. For α ≤ 1/2 V (LPS) = 1 when
identifiers are fixed.
2.2 Free Identifier Changes
If players can change their identifiers freely, LPS is no longer an equi-
librium, because a player can defect, then acquire a new identifier
and be treated as a newcomer, against whom other players coop-
erate. Another strategy, however, does lead to total cooperation in
equilibrium. That strategy, the public grim trigger strategy (PGTS—a
generalized punishment strategy), has every player defect if there has
ever been a defection in an earlier period, and otherwise cooperate.
As long as α ≤ 1/2, cooperation is the best strategy while everyone
else is cooperating and defection is the best strategy if a defection
triggers everyone else to start defecting. Thus, PGTS is a sequential
equilibrium. For α ≤ 1/2 V (PGTS) = 1. Intuitively, however PGTS
seems fragile and unrealistic. We now introduce a new element into
the model that highlights the fragility of PGTS.
14 Note also that 1 − α plays a role analogous to a discount factor, although this
model does not include an explicit discount factor.
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3. Malicious Players and Trembles
Suppose there are a few malicious players who like to see others suffer
and thus will choose actions that cause a general increase in the level
of defection. Malicious players make up a small but nonzero fraction
of the population, ε. Alternatively, consider the problem of occasional
mistakes by well-meaning players. These may occur from errors of
judgment, unstable network connections (a player who is faring badly
in a backgammon game may quit the game because of a lost network
connection, which could appear to the opponent as poor sportsman-
ship) or simply because a person mistakenly hits the wrong key on
a keyboard. Let ε be the probability that when a player attempts to
choose an action, she trembles and plays the other action. In the pres-
ence of trembles, a strategy determines the deliberate choices that
players make, conditioned on the observed actions of others. Trem-
bles are randomly determined after their deliberate choices, so that a
player who deliberately chooses D will actually play C with probabil-
ity ε, and vice versa.15
In our model, we need some exogenous variability in the number
of new identifiers each period, to eliminate unrealistic strategies that
trigger on the number of new identifiers. The variability could come
from variation in the number of players leaving the game. Instead, we
assume that at the end of each period each player loses his identifier
by accident with probability ε and must start again as an entrant with
a new identifier. There is no reason why the probability of losing one’s
identifier should be equal to that of trembling; we simply assume this
to reduce notation.
The effects of malicious players are similar to those for trembles,
since each introduces a few defections that are not chosen by nor-
mal players. In the remainder of this paper we focus on the model
with trembles. The analysis for the game with malicious players is
analogous.16
We will be interested in the social welfare for fixed ε and large
populations. Let V ∗(εM) be the supremum of V (s) over all sequen-
tial equilibria, with population M in each period and the probability
15 Note that when there are finite trembles, this game is essentially a repeated
game with imperfect public information (Green and Porter, 1984; Abreu et al., 1990), i.e.,
players cannot always tell whether defections were deliberate or caused by trembles.
16 That a small probability of trembles or malicious players can have important
effects is well known. For example, the evolutionary behavior of the prisoner’s dilemma
is very different with trembles than without (Nowak and Sigmund, 1993), and the
presence of a few atypical players can have dramatic effects on the set of equilibria
(Kreps et al., 1982).
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of a tremble ε and probability of a lost identifier ε. Define the stable






Thus, the stable value is the maximal expected per-period social wel-
fare when the population is large in relation to the error rate.17
To simplify presentation and analysis, we will rely on order nota-
tion. Thus, the statement g(ε) = O(f (ε)) implies that there exists
some c > 0 such that for ε sufficiently small, |g(ε)| ≤ cf (ε). Similarly,
for M, where we are interested in large values, g(M) = O(f (M))
implies that there exists some c > 0 such that for M sufficiently large,
|g(M)| ≤ cf (M).
3.1 Fixed Identifiers
First, consider the case in which players cannot change their iden-
tifiers. The LPS strategy, where players defect against players who
deviated in the previous period, is an equilibrium, with no deliberate
defection.
Proposition 1: For all α < 03M > 1, and ε < 01, LPS is an equilib-
rium with V (s) = 1 −O(ε). More precisely, V (s) ≥ 1 − 2ε.
Thus, we get the standard result of full cooperation (except for
trembles) analogous to that for a prisoner’s dilemma of iterated play
with the same partner.
Corollary 1: For the game with persistent identities, SV = 1.
3.2 Free Identifier Changes
When players can freely change identifiers, malicious players or trem-
bles ruin the PGTS equilibrium. A single tremble or malicious player
causes mass defection in future periods. For any ε > 0, PGTS has an
expected average per-period payoff of 0: V (PGTS) = 0.
As discussed by Ellison (1994), PGTS can be replaced by a pub-
lic forgiving trigger strategy (PFTS) that works for (very) small ε > 0.
In PFTS a player cooperates until the first time someone defects. Then
17 Note that this stable value differs from that in some analyses of games with
trembles, in which the order of the limits is reversed. For example, with the order
reversed, Ellison’s (1994) analysis shows that the prisoner’s dilemma with anonymous
random matching attains limM→∞ limε→0 V (εM) = 1 using randomized versions of
contagion strategies, whereas Friedman (1999) has shown that the stable value for that
game is 0. The SV order of limits is more appropriate for our analysis, where we expect
a large enough population so that at least one error per period is expected. The reversed
order would effectively take a limit where the number of errors, Mε, approaches 0.
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she chooses D for a finite number of periods (the punishment phase),
after which she goes back to cooperating. For fixed ε, however, as M
gets large, there will be a tremble in almost every period and this will
not be an equilibrium.18
The point of the punishment phase is to deter nonmalicious play-
ers from defecting. An alternative way to do that is through a paying
your dues strategy (PYD), which makes it much less attractive to have a
new identifier than one that has a history of cooperative action. Essen-
tially, it rewards positive reputations rather than punishing negative
reputations. Under PYD, when an entrant meets a compliant veteran
(nonentrant) the entrant chooses C and the veteran chooses D. Thus,
“dues” are transferred from the entrant to the veteran, although at a
cost to overall efficiency. The dues act as an endogenous entry fee,
discouraging a veteran from deviating, since he must then change his
name, behave as an entrant, and pay more dues.
While our prisoner’s dilemma model suggests that dues be paid
in the form of defection against cooperative newcomers in a simulta-
neous game, in practice newcomers’ dues may take several forms. In
fraternity initiation, newcomers perform work or accept humiliation.
At eBay, new buyers may have to accept shipping delays (for exam-
ple, a seller may wait for a newcomer’s check to clear before sending
goods, but send goods immediately to veteran buyers), and new sell-
ers may have to accept lower prices for their goods.19 Kollock (1998)
reports that newcomers accept more transaction risks in the on-line
environment for trading playing cards for the game Magic. After peo-
ple who have never met each other agree to exchange cards (or sell
cards for money), the person without an established reputation has to
send his card first; the veteran should reciprocate after receiving the
newcomer’s card, but the newcomer accepts the risk that this might
not happen.
Formally, the PYD strategies are as follows. Identifiers are
divided into two types, entrants (those that have no history of pre-
vious actions) and veterans. Identifiers are said to be in compliance if
all their past actions conform to the PYD strategy (entrants are trivially
in compliance). Note that an identifier can remain in compliance even
after defecting, so long as the defection was called for in the PYD strat-
egy. A player always cooperates if both she and her opponent are the
18 Even if trembles are very rare, an environment where PFTS operates may
attract a malicious player, since such a player can create a large disruption. Thus, in
(the perhaps more realistic) case when the number of malicious players is endogenous,
our discussion is also valid.
19 In a somewhat different scenario, Shapiro (1983) suggests below-cost pricing as
a way of investing in a reputation, and Klein and Leffler (1981) suggest that newcomers
could make other firm-specific capital investments such as purchasing advertising.
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same type and in compliance. If a compliant veteran meets an entrant,
then the entrant chooses C and, if q < q̂(α εM), the veteran chooses
D (otherwise C), where
q̂(α εM) = 1 − 1/M
(1 − α)(2 − α− 2/M − ε + ε/M + εα)(1 − 2ε) 
(Note that to improve efficiency we only require dues to be paid part
of the time. This is the reason for introducing the exogenous signal q.)
If either player is not in compliance, then both players choose D.
Finally, the strategy calls for a player whose identifier is not in com-
pliance to take on a new identifier and begin again as an entrant.
The function q̂(α εM) is precisely the minimal punishment
probability to prevent a player from deliberately deviating and then
returning as an entrant in the following period. In the absence of
trembles, for M going to infinity, this equilibrium has expected pay-
off per player of 1/α− 1/(2 − α). Some of a player’s first-period dues
may be recovered in later periods if the player is allowed to defect
against a newcomer, but there is a net loss of between 0.5 and 1 utils
per player. As the following proposition shows, for small ε, PYD is still
an equilibrium with approximately the same payoffs.
Proposition 2: For α < 03 ε < 01, M > 11, and q̂(α εM) ≤ 1,
PYD is an equilibrium of the game with impersistent identities, where V (s) =
1 − α/(2 − α)−O(ε)−O(1/M).
From this we get a lower bound for the stable value, resulting
from the dues paid by newcomers [essentially, the α/(2 − α) term].
As ε → 0 in computing the stable value limit, the losses by veter-
ans who tremble go to 0. [Note that the condition q̂(α εM) ≤ 1 is
automatically satisfied when α < 024 or ε < 005]
Corollary 2: For the game with impersistent identities, SV ≥ 1 − α/
(2 − α).
Note that for small ε, the PYD equilibrium implies an average
loss in (unnormalized) payoffs to each player of (2 − α)−1, which is
approximately 1/2 for α close to zero.
Although compliant veterans never deliberately deviate from the
PYD equilibrium, the equilibrium includes defections. There is dues
paying by newcomers and by veterans who trembled in the previous
period, leading to some inefficiency. It is logical that trembling players
be punished, else other players will misbehave and claim to have
trembled. It seems wasteful, however, to punish the true newcomers,
who have done nothing wrong. If, somehow, the trembling players
were usually punished but the true newcomers usually were not, such
an outcome would have value V (s) = 1−O(ε) and a stable value of 1
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even though previous-period deviants cannot be distinguished from
this period’s true newcomers.
It is, in fact, possible, to do somewhat better than the PYD equi-
librium. For example, consider a variant that omits the dues for new-
comers in any period following one where there are no deviations.
This strategy yields an equilibrium, but for fixed ε, as M gets large
there will almost always be at least one deviation, so the improvement
over PYD is only O(e−εM).
More generally, there may be ways to condition the payoffs for
newcomers in the next period on the collective behavior of veterans
in the previous period (more dues next period if more deviation this
period). This increases the fraction of the total dues paid by trem-
blers (as opposed to true newcomers). Our next proposition, however,
shows that no equilibrium yields significantly higher payoffs than
PYD. Thus, while there can be improvements over the PYD equilib-
rium, the improvements are slight and the bound for the stable value
given in Corollary 2 is tight.
The key ideas in the proof are:
1. Although an equilibrium can have unusual behavior for special
periods or special players, on average, veterans must receive ex-
pected payoffs that are sufficiently larger than the entrants’ payoffs
to prevent someone from defecting and then returning in the fol-
lowing period as a new entrant. (See Lemma 2 in the proof, which
is given in Appendix A.3.)
2. The most efficient (i.e., with the fewest defections) way to create a
differential between the value of being a veteran and that of being
an entrant is by having a veteran defect against an entrant, since
this transfers utility from the entrants to the veterans. (See Lemma
5 in the proof.)
Proposition 3: Fix α < 03. There exists some β > 0 such that for any
v̄ > 1 − α/(2 − α) there exists an ε̄ such that for all ε < ε̄ and M > β/ε
there is no equilibrium s∗ of the game with impersistent identities which has
V (s∗) ≥ v̄.
Thus, the stable value is precisely what was obtained from the
PYD equilibrium.
Corollary 3: For the game with impersistent identities, SV = 1 − α/
(2 − α).
This shows that there is no fully efficient stable equilibrium
when identities are not persistent and PYD has the highest payoffs
[to within O(ε) + O(1/M)] of any equilibrium strategy. One further
implication of the two ideas behind the proof is that any equilibrium
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with approximately as much cooperation as PYD must have almost
all its defections be by veterans against entrants. Thus, although the
PYD equilibrium is not unique, all other equilibria that achieve near-
maximum efficiency must operate in the same spirit that PYD does,
with veterans defecting against entrants. In particular, slow-start
schemes where newcomers initially play low-stakes games until they
build reputations would be less efficient than schemes that transfer
utility from newcomers to veterans.
4. Payments for Identifiers
The simplest method to attain full efficiency in the game with imper-
sistent identities and either malicious players or trembles is to make
dues paying explicit, as with the imposition of an entry fee.20 It is
easy to see that if such a fee is chosen appropriately, then players
will have a sufficient incentive not to defect from the equilibrium and
begin again with a new identifier, as they would then incur a new
entry fee.
Suppose that the entry fees collected in period t + 1 are dis-
tributed evenly among all the players who participated in period t.
Since such a fee is purely a transfer, it does not affect efficiency. If
each player uses, in expectation, the same number of identifiers, then
each player will, in expectation, collect back exactly the amount of her
entry fee. Players who change identifiers deliberately would increase
the amount that other players collect in distributions. Thus, if an equi-
librium strategy calls for a player not to change identifiers deliberately,
the entry fee will not affect that player’s willingness to participate.
While attractive, this scheme suffers from two problems. First,
the redistribution payments may introduce incentives for players to
stay in the game beyond the time when their natural interest or life
circumstances change. Thus, redistribution of entry fees would invali-
date our modeling of the exit process as exogenous. Even without this
problem, this solution does not work if players’ expected lifetimes are
heterogeneous. For example, some players may know that they have
a short attention span and thus don’t expect to be in the system long
enough to recoup their entry fee.
These problems can be eliminated if entry fees are not redis-
tributed to the players (perhaps they are given to charity, or kept
as profit by an entity running the environment). If, however, player
20 An alternative is to require posting of a bond for each new identifier, to be for-
feited if some central authority determines that the player has deviated from acceptable
behavior. The advantage of straight entry fees over bonds is that no central authority
is needed, which is important on the Internet, where there is often strong distrust of
such authorities.
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payoffs are heterogeneous, such fees will introduce inefficiency: some
players will choose not to participate.
To make this argument explicitly, consider a variation of the
game with impersistent identities in which players’ varying wealth
causes them to value money differently, as modeled by a parame-
ter λ ∈ (0 1]. The expected payoff for a player with intensity λ is
V (s)/α− λF , where F is the entry fee. Our point is easily made when
α = 01 and players’ intensities are i.i.d. with λ = 1 (the poor players)
with probability p and λ = 001 (the wealthy players) with probability
1−p. It is clear that in this case, the entry fee must be sufficiently large
to prevent the wealthy players from deviating, but this will deter the
other players from entering, thereby leading to efficiency losses. More
generally, the optimal entry fee will often exclude some players yet
still be insufficient to deter the wealthiest players from defecting. A
similar problem occurs if players have heterogeneous payoffs in the
game rather than heterogeneous value for money; in that case, the
optimal dues for a PYD equilibrium would also exclude some players
from the game yet be insufficient to deter some others from defecting
regularly. The problem of large fixed costs deterring some entrants is
well known in the economics literature, but standard solutions such
as price discrimination or two-part tariffs are not applicable here.
5. Identifier Commitments
We now describe an implementable system that achieves full efficiency
even in the presence of heterogeneous payoffs, by allowing players to
credibly commit not to change identifiers, still without revealing their
true identities. As a starting point, suppose that there were an interme-
diary, trusted by all players.21 The intermediary assigns identifiers to
players when they request them, but promises never to reveal which
players received which identifiers. Suppose that the intermediary also
offers a special class of identifiers, which we call once-in-a-lifetime iden-
tifiers, but for each social arena will issue at most one such identifier
to each player. A player with a once-in-a-lifetime identifier is not pre-
vented from returning with a regular identifier, although regular iden-
tifiers may be viewed with suspicion by other players.
Any equilibrium strategy vector for the game where identifiers
are fixed can be extended to a strategy vector for the game where
players have the option of using once-in-a-lifetime identifiers. Play-
ers choose D against regular identifiers and follow the original strat-
egy against once-in-a-lifetime identifiers. Since regular identifiers are
21 Other forms of intermediary have already emerged to reduce risk in ecommerce.
For example, auction sites offer insurance and links to escrow services, but insurance
introduces inefficiency from moral hazard, and escrow services introduce significant
transaction costs.
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treated so poorly, use of a once-in-a-lifetime identifier effectively sig-
nals a commitment to keep using that identifier rather than returning
anonymously. Conversely, a player who does not use a once-in-a-
lifetime identifier (i.e., does not make an identifier commitment) sig-
nals that she is not trustworthy. In equilibrium, no one uses regular
identifiers.
In particular, LPS (defect against anyone who deviated in the pre-
vious period) extends to an equilibrium with nearly complete cooper-
ation (only trembles are punished). Note also that even if players dif-
fer in the intensity of their payoffs, this remains an equilibrium with
full participation and full cooperation, unlike entry fees, which might
exclude some players from participating. Thus we note that in this
game the stable value is 1.
In this scenario, the players have to trust the intermediary not
to reveal their true identities, even though the intermediary knows
the mapping between players and identifiers. We can reduce the trust
requirement somewhat through a cryptographic technique known as
blind signatures (Schneier, 1996, pp. 112–114).22 The protocol, though
it would actually be implemented using encrypted electronic commu-
nications, is easiest to describe with an analogy to carbon paper and
envelopes. Player A signs the outside of an envelope with her true
signature. A then types up a letter specifying a new once-in-a-lifetime
identifier for herself and puts it in the envelope together with a piece
of carbon paper. She sends the envelope to the intermediary, who
checks A’s signature on the envelope without opening it. After check-
ing that A has not previously requested a once-in-a-lifetime identifier,
the intermediary signs the outside of the envelope; because of the
carbon paper, the signature bleeds through onto the letter. The inter-
mediary sends the unopened envelope back to A, who removes the
letter, now signed by the intermediary, and presents it to other players
in the game as proof of her once-in-a-lifetime identifier.
The intermediary never learns what identifier A is using, since it
was sealed in the envelope, although the intermediary knows that A
acquired some once-in-a-lifetime identifier. This protocol is still subject
to a timing attack, however: the intermediary can watch to see what
new once-in-a-lifetime identifier is used in the game, and associate
it with the last player who requested one. If players wish to avoid
22 One of the strengths of the Internet is the ease with which complicated encryp-
tion and verification mechanisms can be implemented. For example, Eudora Lite, a
standard email program, is distributed free with Pretty Good Privacy, an encryption
program which provides a large degree of security against eavesdroppers. It is easy to
use even for the novice, as the program does most of the work. Thus, it is possible
for ordinary people to use sophisticated encryption programs, something that is quite
difficult for nonelectronic transactions.
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this, they need to acquire their identifiers and hold onto them for a
random length of time before they use them.
The envelope and carbon paper protocol described above can
be implemented quite practically if identifiers correspond to private-
public encryption key pairs. Encryption keys are just long strings of
bits; the private portion of the key pair is known only to the key’s
owner, while the public key is available to everyone. A private key
is used to “sign” a string of bits by computing a function of the bits
and the private key. The function works such that anyone with the
corresponding public key can verify that the private key was used to
make the signature, but no one can forge a signature by computing
the function’s output without knowing the private key.23
Each player is assumed to start with a private key associated
with her true identity.24 To establish a once-in-a-lifetime identifier for
some arena, player A first constructs a brand-new key pair (a new
pseudonym). A sends the public half of the new pair to the inter-
mediary, but blinds it by multiplying by a randomly chosen number
(the equivalent of sealing it in an envelope with carbon paper). The
player uses the private key for her true identity to sign the request, so
that the intermediary can verify that it came from A (only someone
knowing A’s private key could have generated the signature). If the
intermediary has never previously certified a pseudonym for A, the
intermediary uses its own private key to sign the new blinded public
key that A provided. A receives the blinded signed key and is able to
remove the blinding factor (the equivalent of opening the envelope),
leaving a certificate, signed by the intermediary, that attests that the
new public key is valid as a once-in-a-lifetime identifier. The interme-
diary knows that A has acquired a once-in-a-lifetime identifier, but
does not know which one.
Subsequently, player A can participate in the game without
revealing her true identity. She presents the certificate and signs com-
munications with the pseudonym’s private key (not the private key
associated with her true identity). Other players can verify that the
certificate is authentic, using the intermediary’s public key to verify
the intermediary’s signature. They can verify that the communications
are signed by whoever owns the once-in-a-lifetime identifier, using the
23 Private-public encryption and signature-handling software is already built into
the major web browsers and is routinely used for establishing private communication
(URLs that begin https:// usually cause this feature to be invoked) and for assessing
the safety of downloaded code.
24 There are some practical difficulties to be surmounted in setting up an infras-
tructure for establishing key pairs for individuals and publicizing the public portion.
A few companies, most notably Verisign, have established a foothold in this business,
and there is also speculation that governments may provide such services.
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identifier’s public key. But no one, not even the intermediary, can tell
that the identifier belongs to A.
Note that while this procedure involves sending long strings of
bits, the transmission requirements are extremely modest compared
to even a simple web page. The computational burden of generating
and verifying digital signatures is not trivial, but comparable crypto-
graphic operations are performed routinely by both clients and servers
on the Internet today. The burden on people is also minimal: as little
as a single keystroke or mouseclick to tell the computer to send the
once-in-a-lifetime identifier.
There can be different intermediaries for different social arenas,
or a single intermediary can handle several arenas simultaneously,
enforcing a restriction of one once-in-a-lifetime identifier per arena.
For game servers or support groups, this process will prevent play-
ers returning over and over again with new pseudonyms, while pro-
tecting their true identities. There is still a danger that a person can
acquire several once-in-a-lifetime identifiers for a single arena, if she
uses several people’s true identifiers to acquire the certificates. If a
robust cryptography infrastructure develops, however, most people
will be very reluctant to allow another to use their true identifiers.
In any case, the need to use a true identifier to acquire a once-in-a-
lifetime identifier will impose almost no cost on individuals who wish
to acquire just one, but will impose a significant cost on those who
try to acquire several.
How should the intermediary for an arena be selected? One pos-
sibility would be for the official intermediary to be allocated accord-
ing to some public auction. Once chosen, the intermediary will be a
monopolist (we cannot have competition unless the competitors share
information about which players have already been issued committed
identifiers). The initial auction, however, can compete away (most of)
the monopolists’ rents, at least for those services that can be specified
by contract. Thus, for example, the winner of the auction may have
to agree to provide identifiers for a fixed fee, and within a specified
turnaround time, or else lose its franchise. The intermediary may also
be required to submit to regular audits, to make sure that it issues
only one once-in-a-lifetime identifier per player.25
There is still a trade-off between anonymity and accountability
in the choice of how broad a set of activities to define as a single
25 Auctioning monopoly rights can be problematic, especially when there is uncer-
tainty about demand or cost of provision, lock-in to one provider over time, or difficulty
in monitoring, as noted by Williamson (1976). However, the marginal costs of provid-
ing once-in-a-lifetime pseudonyms are sufficiently small and the service is so clearcut
(and easily contracted on) that auctioning monopoly rights might be expected to work
reasonably well in practice.
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arena. Should the arena in which a person commits to a single iden-
tifier consist of eBay’s Beanie Baby auctions, all eBay auctions, or all
auctions at any on-line service? A broader arena increases accountabil-
ity, both because there will be more historical data available to assess
any individual’s reputation, and because a bad reputation follows an
individual to more places.
However, the broader the arena, the more opportunities there are
for correlating behavior between activities that an individual would
like to keep separate. For example, a participant in an Alcoholics
Anonymous support group may not want comments there linked
with comments he makes in other arenas, and a seller of sex toys
may not want to use the same pseudonym for sales of children’s
toys. In the most extreme case, there would be just one arena for
all of the Internet and hence just one Internet identifier per person.
We would expect more narrowly defined arenas, however, in those
sensitive areas where people care more about anonymity.
6. Concluding Remarks
Even in the physical world, name changes have always been possible
as a way to erase one’s reputation. The Internet highlights the issue,
by making name changes almost cost-free. This creates a situation
where positive reputations are valuable, but negative reputations do
not stick. It is natural to ask how much cooperation can be sustained
relying only on positive reputations. The answer is: quite a lot, but
not complete cooperation. A natural convention is to distrust or even
mistreat strangers until they establish positive reputations.
Suspicion of strangers is costly to society. It is especially costly on
the Internet, since the great potential of the medium is to allow people
to expand their horizons, to sample a variety of interest groups, and
to trade with people they have never met. It would be nice to create
environments where strangers were trusted until proven otherwise.
Unfortunately, obvious strategy vectors involving cooperation with
strangers are not stable, and we have proved that no strategy vector
can do substantially better than punishing all newcomers.
Thus, there is an inherent social cost to free name changes. We
can mitigate this cost by charging for name changes, but this also
requires charging for names in the first place. That may exclude poor
people or those who are just exploring and not yet sure whether
the payoffs from participation would justify the entry fee. A better
solution is to give people the option of committing not to change
identifiers. We described cryptographic mechanisms that enable cred-
ible commitment to a single pseudonym within some arena, without
revealing one’s true identity. We expect both techniques for limiting
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name changes—entry fees and pseudonym commitments—to blossom
in Internet arenas.
Appendix. Proofs of Propositions
A.1 Proposition 1
For all α < 03M > 1, and ε < 01, LPS is an equilibrium with V (s) =
1 −O(ε). More precisely, V (s) ≥ 1 − 2ε.
The proof of Proposition 1 is similar to standard equilibrium
proofs, with some complications due to the existence of finite tremble
probabilities.
First, consider a single deviation from the asserted equilibrium.
The only possibly profitable deviation is to try to defect when LPS
calls for cooperation. When the defection is carried out, the gain is 1
over cooperation (for either action by the opponent), but the player’s
opponent will try to defect in the next period. This increases by 1−2ε
(due to trembles) the probability of the opponent actually defecting in
the next period, which would impose a penalty of 2 (for either action
by the player). Thus, a decision to deviate will be profitable only if
1 > 2(1 − α)(1 − 2ε). But for the given parameters, this is never true:
2(1 − α)(1 − 2ε) > 2(1 − 03)(1 − 02) = 112 > 1. Thus, LPS is an
equilibrium.
Next, we compute the per-period average payoff for each player.
In any period, some players may have deviated (unintentionally) from
LPS. When two nondeviators meet, they (attempt to) cooperate, and
each has an expected payoff of (1−ε)2(1)+ε(1−ε)(2)+ε(1−ε)(−1)+
ε2(0) = 1− ε. When two deviators meet, they (attempt to) defect, and
the expected payoff is (1 − ε)2(0)+ε(1−ε)(−1)+ε(1−ε)(2)+ε2(1) = ε.
Similarly, a deviator meeting a nondeviator gets −1 + 3ε, and the
opposite yields 2−3ε. If there were k deviations in the previous period,

























Using the fact that E[k/M] = ε in equilibrium, this is 1 − 2ε + 2ε2,
which is larger than 1 − 2ε.
A.2 Proposition 2
For α < 03 ε < 01, and M > 11, and q̂(α εM) ≤ 1, PYD is an
equilibrium of the game with impersistent identities, where V (s) = 1 −
α/(2 − α)−O(ε)−O(1/M).
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As in the previous proof, the gain for defecting when the equilib-
rium strategy calls for cooperating is 1, while the loss arises because
the expected payoff in the next period is reduced, since the player
must return as an entrant. This loss only occurs when qt+1 ≤ q̂. If the
player is matched with a veteran, then the loss is due to the vet-
eran choosing defection (which leads to a loss of 2 utils when it hap-
pens) with probability 1 − ε instead of probability ε. If the player
is matched with an entrant, then the loss is due to the player not
defecting (which loses 1 util when it happens) with probability 1 − ε
instead of ε. The probability of being matched with an entrant in
the next period is the same whether the player deviates or not, and
can be calculated from the expected number of trembles this period
and the expected number of true newcomers in the next period, pe =
{Mα+ [M(1 − α)− 1]ε}/(M − 1).
The expected loss, then, from a defection when the strategy calls
for cooperation is (1−α)(1−2ε)q̂[pe+2(1−pe)]. Thus, players will not
try to deviate, which increases the probability of actually deviating, if
1 ≤ (1−α)(1−2ε)q̂[pe +2(1−pe)], which is satisfied with equality for
the value of q̂ in the proposition.
To compute the expected payoff for this equilibrium, we note
that by stationarity and anonymity of PYD we need only compute the
average payoff for a period. To do this we note that the total payoff in
a period isM−M̂, where M̂ is the number of defections in that period,
since every defection costs 1 util in total payoffs. Thus V = 1 − pD,
where pD is the probability that a randomly chosen player will defect.
The only type of player who attempts to defect in equilibrium is a
veteran who is matched with an entrant in a period in which qt ≤ q̂.
Let p be the probability that a veteran is matched with an entrant.
Then pD = (1 − ε)q̂p + ε(1 − p). Since in any period there are (on
average) Mα+M(1− α)ε entrants, p = α(1− α)+O(ε+ 1/M). Since
q̂ = [(1 − α)(2 − α)]−1 +O(ε + 1/M), this implies that
pD =
α
2 − α +O(ε + 1/M)
and thus
V = 1 − pD = 1 −
α
2 − α −O(ε + 1/M)
proving the proposition.
A.3 Proposition 3
Fix α < 03. There exists some β > 0 such that for any v̄ > 1 − α/(2 − α)
there exists an ε̄ such that for all ε < ε̄ andM > β/ε there is no equilibrium
s∗ of the game with impersistent identities with V (s∗) ≥ v̄.
194 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
We will show that no strategy vector with average expected pay-
offs greater than 1/α − 1/(2 − α) can provide sufficient incentives to
prevent entrants from defecting. An equilibrium can include unusual
behavior in selected periods or by selected players. We establish, how-
ever, a minimal difference, on average, between the payoffs of new-
comers and veterans. If this minimum is not met, then there will be at
least one player (at least one newcomer, in fact) who in some period
would deviate from the strategy. This is sufficient to infer a minimal
number of defections in any equilibrium strategy.
First note that for any equilibrium, there is a payoff-equivalent
equilibrium in which no player ever intentionally gets a new identity.
Let s be a set of strategies. Define s′ to be the set of strategies that
are identical with s except for the following: (1) if s tells a player to
intentionally get a new identity, then s′ has the player maintain her
current identity; (2) in s′, when playing against a player who would
have gotten a new identity in s, treat them as if they were an entrant in
the most recent period when they should have gotten a new identity.
Clearly, such a change will not affect any player’s payoffs or incen-
tives, and thus s′ is still an equilibrium and is payoff-equivalent (along
every sample path) to s. Thus, if there is an equilibrium strategy with
payoffs greater than our bound, there is also one that involves no
deliberate name changes (except after name trembles). Without loss
of generality, we assume for the remainder of the proof that strategies
involve no deliberate name changes.
Define Vi to be the expected per-period payoff to player i condi-
tional on the history of play before she enters (note that we are sup-
pressing the explicit notation for histories, for ease of presentation).
Note that Vi will be the same for all new identifiers in the period that i
begins. Thus we will abuse the notation slightly by writing Vt for the
expected per-period payoff to any newcomer in period t, and Vb(i) for
the expected per-period payoff to any newcomer in i’s first period.
Define Wi as the expected per-period payoff for player i starting in
the second period of participation [b(i)+1], conditional on the fact that
the player actually conformed to the strategy in the previous period,
conditional on not exiting after the first period, and conditional on all
information available at the time of their action choice in the period
in which they enter. Define V ′i as the expected per-period payoff to
player i starting in the second period of participation, conditional on
player i actually deviating and not exiting.
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Lemma 1: For all ψφ > 0 there exists some β > 0 such that for all
M > β/ε the following holds: Given any t > 0, let Z be the set of entrants
in period t−1; then the set Z′ = {i ∈ Z|V ′i −Vt > ψ} satisfies |Z
′ | < φ|Z|.26
We will refer to Z′ as the trigger players, the ones whose devia-
tions trigger big changes in the payoffs in the next period. The proof
is by contradiction. Suppose there exist ψφ > 0 such that for any
β > 0 there is a strategy vector s, withM > β/ε, such that |Z′| ≥ φ|Z|.
Let x ∈ {0 1}Z, where xi = 1 if player i ∈ Z deviates in period
t − 1, and 0 otherwise. Let V (x) be the expected value of Vt under s
if x is the actual pattern of deviations by entrants in period t − 1. Let
. be the set of all permutations of Z that respect Z′ i.e., σ ∈ . is a
mapping Z → Z such that σ(Z′) = Z′ With a slight abuse of notation
let σ(x) be the permutation of the vector x by σ , e.g., σ(x)σ(i) = xi.
Now consider a new function V̂ (·) defined as follows: V̂ (x) =
.σ∈.V (σ(x))/|.|. Define V̂ ′i = E[V̂ in period t|i deviates in period
t − 1] and V̂t = E[V̂ in period t]. Note that, since deviations by all
trigger players are equally likely, V̂t = Vt. Moreover, if i ∈ Z\Z′, then
V̂ ′i is the average among nontrigger players of V
′
i (again, because in
equilibrium deviations by all trigger players are equally likely), but
V ′i − Vt ≤ ψ for all such players, so that V̂ ′i − Vt ≤ ψ for such players.
Similarly, if i ∈ Z′ then V̂ ′i −Vt > ψ. Thus, V̂ has the same set of trigger
players as V , but V̂ (x) depends only on the number of deviations
by each type of entrant (trigger and nontrigger) and not on which
particular players deviate.
We will now show that when there are enough trigger play-
ers, each can have only a limited effect on the distribution of the
number of deviations, and hence on V̂ , which contradicts the def-
inition of being a trigger player. Define V̂ k = E[V̂ |k deviations by
trigger players]. Thus, Vt = E[V̂ k], while for a trigger player i ∈ Z′
we have V ′i = E[V̂ k|i actually deviates]. Let m = |Z′|, the number
of trigger players. Then the probability of k deviations by trigger
players is given by the formula for a binomial distribution, Pmk =
[m!/k!(m− k)!]εk(1− ε)m−k, while for k ≥ 1 the probability, contingent
on i deviating, is Pm−1k−1 . This implies that
V̂ ′i − V̂t = −V̂ 0Pm0 +
m∑
k=1
V̂ k(Pm−1k−1 − Pmk )
26 This result closely parallels the main lemma in Fudenberg et al. (1998), in a
different setting.
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Since V̂ k ∈ [−1 2], we see that
1
2
|V̂ ′i − V̂t| ≤ Pm0 +
m∑
k=1
|Pm−1k−1 − Pmk |
The sum on the r.h.s. of this equation is equal to
mε∑
k=1
Pmk − Pm−1k−1 +
m∑
k=mε+1
Pm−1k−1 − Pmk 
and thus the r.h.s. of that equation is equal to the sum of |Pr[k ≤
mε] − |Pr[k ≤ mε|i deviates] and Pr[k > mε] − Pr[k > mε
|i deviates]|, assuming that mε is not an integer; but both of these
terms are small, since mε is the mode of both distributions, and all
the probabilities converge to 12 +O((mε)−1/2) by the central limit the-
orem (Hoeffding, 1994). Thus, it is easy to show that the r.h.s. of that
equation is O((mε)−1/2) for fixed α and is O((Mε)−1/2) for fixed φ,
since, by assumption, m > φM. Thus for Mε sufficiently large, this
implies that V̂ ′i − V̂t ≤ ψ, providing the required contradiction.
Intuitively, the assumption of a constant fraction of trigger play-
ers means that, as M gets large, there are a large number of trigger
players. But when there are large number of them, and the payoffs are
controlled only by the number who deviate (and not which ones), one
player’s deliberate decision to deviate can have only a minor impact
on the total payoffs. But that contradicts what it means to be trigger
player. ✷
Now, consider an entrant i who in equilibrium chooses C in her
first period of play. The immediate benefit from a deviation is 1, while
the future cost of returning the next period as an entrant is (Wi−V ′i )/α
with probability 1 − α. Thus, to maintain equilibrium, we must have
[(1 − α)/α](Wi − V ′i ) > 1.
For an entrant i who in equilibrium chooses D in her first period
of play, there is no immediate benefit from a deviation. However, if
Wi − V ′i < 0, she will choose to get a new name in the following
period. Thus, to maintain an equilibrium with no deliberate name
changes, we must have Wi − V ′i > 0.
Fix α T > 0, and define V (T) to be the expected value of Vi
averaged over all players entering before period T , i.e., all i such that
b(i) < T . Note that since the same number of entrants are expected in
each period, V (T) is also the average of Vt over all t < T . Similarly,
let W(T) be the expected average over Wi for all i such that b(i) < T .
For r s ∈ {e v} let prs be the empirical probability in periods 1
through T that a player of type r defects against a player of type s,
and let pr be the empirical probability that type r defects and p the
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empirical probability that any player defects. Note that since players
never deliberately change names, to O(ε+ 1/M) we have pr = αpre +
(1 − α)prv and p = αpe + (1 − α)pv.
Lemma 2: If s is an equilibrium, then (1 − α)(W − V )/α ≥ (1 − pe) −
O(ψ + φ+ 1/T + ε + 1/M).
Proof. On all sample paths, [(1−α)/α](Wi−V ′i ) ≥ 1 for players who
choose C in their first period in the system, and [(1−α)/α](Wi−V ′i ) ≥
0 for those who choose D. Note that 1−pe of the entrants are of the first
type and pe are of the second type. By Lemma 1, only a fraction φ are
trigger players, and their payoffs are bounded, and of the remaining
players, their V ′i values are within ψ of Vb(i)+1. Finally, note that V is
within a constant of the average of the Vb(i)+1 (a few V0 values are
replaced by VT values). Taking the expectation and combining these
proves the result. ✷
Now we will show that this cannot occur for any equilibrium
with payoffs larger than PYD. First we compute V and W .
Lemma 3: V = 1 − p+O(1/T + 1/M + ε).
Proof. This can be computed directly, but it is most easily seen by
noting that every defection removes one util from the total payoff to
the players. ✷
Lemma 4: W = 1 + α(pve − 2pev)− (1 − α)pvv +O(1/T + 1/M + ε).
Proof. This follows because a defection by a veteran against another
veteran costs the set of veterans 1 util, a defection of a veteran against
an entrant gains 1 util, and a defection of an entrant against a veteran
loses 2 utils. ✷
We now show that if V is large, there are not enough defections
overall to keep W − V sufficiently large.
Lemma 5: If V ≥ 1 − α/(2 − α)+ δ then
1 − α/α(W − V ) ≤
(













for any δ > 0.
Proof. Let Y = [(1−α)/α](W −V )−{1−pe− [(1−α)/α]δ}. Applying
the formulas for W and V yields Y = [(1 − α)/α][α(pve − 2pev)− (1 −
α)pvv + δ+ p]− (1− pe)+O(1/M+ 1/T + ε). Thus, we need to show
that Ymax = {max |Y |V ≥ 1 − α/(2 − α)+ δ} ≤ 0.
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Since V ≥ 1 − p, we have Ymax ≤ {max |Y |p ≤ α/(2 − α) − δ} ≤
{maxY + [α/(2 − α) − δ − p](1 − α)/α|p ≤ α/(2 − α) − δ}. Ignoring
the term O(1/M + 1/T + ε), we get Ymax ≤ {max |[(1 − α)α][α(pve −
2pev)− (1−α)pvv +δ+α/(2−α)−δ]− (1−pe)|p ≤ α/(2−α)−δ}. It is
easy to see that both pev and pvv will be 0 at the maximum, so Ymax ≤
{max(1−α)pve−1/(2−α)+αpee|α2pee+α(1−α)pve ≤ α/(2−α)−δ}. The
constraint implies that Ymax ≤ −1/(2 − α) + 1/(2 − α) − δ/α = −δ/α.
This is strictly negative and thus remains negative when the order
terms, O(1/M + 1/T + ε), are included. ✷
Proof of Proposition. By the assumption on V and Lemma 5 we know
that [(1−α)/α](W −V ) ≤ {1− pe − [(1−α)/α]δ} +O(1/M+ 1/T + ε),
but for any δ > 0, this contradicts Lemma 2 when φψ, and 1/T
are sufficiently small. By Lemma 1, choosing β sufficiently large and
letting T go to infinity makes those values arbitrarily small and thus
yields a contradiction. ✷
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